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Abstract: 
We study the role of institutional characteristics of mortgage markets in affecting the strength 
and timing of the effects of monetary policy shocks on house prices and consumption in a 
sample of OECD countries. We document three facts: (1) there is significant divergence in the 
structure of mortgage markets across the main industrialised countries; (2) at the business 
cycle frequency, the correlation between consumption and house prices increases with the 
degree of flexibility/development of mortgage markets; (3) the transmission of monetary 
policy shocks on consumption and house prices is stronger in countries with more 
flexible/developed mortgage markets. We then build a two-sector dynamic general 
equilibrium model with price stickiness and collateral constraints, where the ability of 
borrowing is endogenously linked to the nominal value of a durable asset (housing). We study 
how the response of consumption to monetary policy shocks is affected by alternative values 
of three key institutional parameters: (i) down-payment rate; (ii) mortgage repayment rate; 
(iii) interest rate mortgage structure (variable vs. fixed interest rate). In line with our empirical 
evidence, the sensitivity of consumption to monetary policy shocks increases with lower 
values of (i) and (ii), and is larger under a variable-rate mortgage structure. 
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 1 Introduction
The role of housing wealth on economic activity has recently attracted considerable attention
among academic researchers, policy-makers and press commentators.1 This attention is
partly explained by the sizeable rises in property prices and household indebtedness in several
industrialised countries over recent years (Debelle (2004), Terrones and Otrok (2004)) and
the need to understand both the determinants of such rises and their potential implications
for monetary policy and ﬁnancial stability. Beyond these policy considerations, there is
g r o w i n gi n t e r e s tf o rt h ee ﬀects of changes in property prices on consumption decisions, given
the predominance of housing in total household wealth (Campbell and Cocco (2003)).
This paper studies the role of institutional characteristics of mortgage markets across
the main industrialised countries, with particular focus on EU countries, in determining
the channels of monetary policy transmission. We begin by establishing two facts on the
relationship between mortgage markets, consumption, and house prices. First, there is sig-
niﬁcant heterogeneity in the institutional characteristics of national mortgage markets across
the main industrialised countries, and especially within the EU. Examples of such institu-
tional characteristics include the typical duration of mortgage contracts, the required levels
of down-payment, the existence (or lack thereof) of equity release products, and the interest-
rate structure of mortgage contracts (e.g., variable vs. ﬁxed rate). We interpret these indica-
tors as measures of the degree of development/ﬂexibility of mortgage markets. Second, the
correlation between private consumption and house prices at the business cycle frequency is
signiﬁcantly related to mortgage markets characteristics, with that correlation being larger
in countries featuring more developed mortgage markets.
We then conduct a VAR-based analysis of the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on
consumption and house prices in a sample of euro area countries, with the addition of
Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity in both the timing and
strength of those eﬀects across countries. In particular, we ﬁnd that the size of the peak
eﬀect of a monetary policy shock on consumption and real house prices is positively related
to indicators of development/ﬂexibility in mortgage markets, such as the mortgage debt to
1For recent academic contributions see Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2004), Davies and Heathcote (2005),
Iacoviello (2005) and the literature review by Leung (2004); for contributions from a policy perspective see
ECB (2003), Catte et al. (2004), Girouard and Blöndal (2001), BIS (2004) and IMF (2005); for a press
account see The Economist (2003).
1GDP ratio, the loan-to-value (LTV henceforth) ratio, and the existence of equity release
products.
In particular, the evidence that private consumption is more responsive to monetary
impulses in economies with more developed mortgage markets is prima facie puzzling. In
fact, a priori, less imperfect ﬁnancial markets should allow agents to smooth consumption
more eﬃciently. Accounting for this fact requires a theoretical framework in which (at least)
af r a c t i o no fa g e n t sd o e sn o ta c ta sp e r m a n e n t - i n c o m ec o n s u m e r s . W et h u sb u i l dam o d e l
that extends the baseline New Keynesian framework in three main directions. First, it
allows for two sectors, respectively producing consumption goods and new housing. Second,
it features heterogeneity of preferences between impatient consumers and patient consumers
(in equilibrium, borrowers and savers respectively). The former do not act as standard
permanent-income agents, but exhibit preferences tilted towards current consumption. The
borrowers may be thought of as the relatively larger share of the population for which
acquiring a loan/mortgage requires providing an asset, and housing in particular, as a form
of collateral. Third, private borrowing is constrained by the value of the collateral. That
value is endogenously tied to the evolution of the nominal price of housing.
Thus, in a context where credit markets allow more easily to convert asset values into
borrowing, and therefore consumption, the latter should be more responsive to underlying
shocks. In our framework, the relevant institutional features of the mortgage market are
summarized by three main parameters: (i) the down-payment rate, (ii) the repayment rate
(or rate of equity release), and (iii) the interest-rate structure of the contract. We calibrate
and simulate the model based on our introductory evidence on the heterogenous character-
istics of mortgage markets in OECD countries. We ﬁnd that the response of consumption
to policy shocks is magniﬁed in more ﬂexible mortgage markets, symbolized by lower down-
payment rates and lower rates of repayment. In addition, the prevalence of variable interest
rate mortgages, and hence of a stronger pass-through of interest rate shocks to mortgage
lending rates, also enhances the response of consumption to monetary policy shocks.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we document some key institutional
diﬀerences in mortgage markets across industrialised countries. We then conduct some VAR-
based empirical analysis in Section 3, focussing on the impact of a monetary policy shock on
housing market-related variables. The structural model is developed in Section 4. Section
5 discusses the steady state of the model, which is then simulated in Section 6. Section 7
2concludes.
2 Institutional Features of Mortgage Markets in EU
Countries
A distinctive feature of mortgage markets in the EU (and, more generally, of the EU’s retail
ﬁnancial services sectors) is their lack of cross-border integration. This implies that mort-
gage lending remains a predominantly domestic business activity, largely reﬂecting national
traditions and cultural factors as well as the institutional settings of the local banking sector.
EU policy makers have repeatedly indicated that further integration would yield a number of
beneﬁts to EU mortgage markets, including the removal of ineﬃciencies, increased competi-
tion and a higher degree of market completeness, while possibly also enhancing the monetary
policy transmission mechanism.2
2.1 Cross-Country Heterogeneity
Mortgage markets diﬀer signiﬁcantly across EU countries in terms of both size and key in-
stitutional characteristics, such as the prevailing contractual arrangements and the available
product range. Table 1 summarises some of the institutional indicators that have been iden-
tiﬁed in the literature as most likely to have a bearing on the relationship between housing
wealth and consumption, as well as on the channels of monetary policy transmission (see,
e.g., MacLennan et al. (1998) and Debelle (2004)). We report data for a total of 18 countries:
euro area countries plus Japan and the main Anglo-Saxon countries.
The indicators included in Table 1 are: (i) mortgage-debt to GDP ratio; (ii) extent
of home ownership; (iii) typical LTV ratio; (iv) type of interest-rate structure; (v) typical
mortgage contract duration, and (vi) diﬀusion of home equity release products.
Cross-country heterogeneity is pervasive in all indicators considered. Mortgage-to-GDP
ratios vary widely across countries: values range between 15% in Italy and 111% in the
2EU policy-makers have set out to promote integration in mortgage markets. In particular, the Forum
Group on Mortgage Credit, set up by the European Commission in 2003, proposed legislative and non-
legislative measures to boost the integration of the EU home loans market. More recently, the European
Commission has launched a public consultation and commissioned research on the economic costs and beneﬁts
of further integration across the national mortgage markets, with a view to assessing the opportunity of
further intervention (European Commission (2005)).
3Netherlands. Among the large countries, Italy and France have the lowest ratios, while the
ratios in the U.K. and the U.S. are relatively high. Countries also diﬀer in terms of home
ownership ratios, with values ranging between 39% in Germany and 85% in Spain. With the
exception of Germany, the majority of homes are owner-occupied in all countries. Also LTV
ratios vary signiﬁcantly across countries, ranging between 50% in Italy and over 110% in the
Netherlands. Cross-country variations in these ratios partly reﬂect diﬀerences in legal and
regulatory frameworks.3 Hence, they reﬂect - at least to some extent - institutional factors
which are largely exogenous.
The heterogeneity in terms of interest rate adjustment is also substantial across EU
countries. Conceptually, mortgage contracts can be distinguished between variable and ﬁxed
rate mortgages: variable rate contracts are those in which the lending rate ﬂoats with, or
is frequently adjusted to, a short-term market interest rate; ﬁxed rate contracts are those
in which the lending rate remains constant throughout the duration of the contract. In
practice, contracts do not always fully conform to these conceptual types and often fall under
intermediate categories (Borio (1996)). Among the EU countries, the U.K., Spain and Italy
mainly have variable or adjustable rate mortgages, although for the latter two countries this
reﬂects a relatively recent development.4 By contrast, Germany, France, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark and the Netherlands are mainly characterised by ﬁxed rate mortgages, similar to
the U.S. and Canada.
Finally, an important element of divergence among national mortgage markets is the
extent of the recourse to home equity release. Following changes in house prices and mortgage
interest rates, liquidity-constrained agents may wish to adjust their net borrowing positions
or to-reﬁnance the terms of their existing mortgages according to the changed conditions. For
instance, following house prices rises, borrowers may increase the amount of their mortgage
loans or apply for a second mortgage against the increased value of their collateral. The
released mortgage equity may be subsequently used for a variety of purposes, such as debt
reﬁnancing, acquisition of durable goods, purchase of ﬁnancial assets or home improvements.
When mortgage interest rates decrease, agents may be willing to re-ﬁnance their mortgages
to take advantage of lower interest payments in order to free liquidity for other expenditures
3For instance, it has been argued (e.g. MacLennan et al., 1998, and Ahearne et al., 2005) that the reason
why the loan to value ratio has been historically low in Italy lies in the diﬃculty for the lender to enforce
repossession in case of default of the borrower, given the country’s slow and costly judicial proceedings.
4Japan also has mainly variable rate mortgages.
4or, alternatively, they may want to increase their borrowing to reﬂect their increased debt
servicing capacity.
Overall, the use of home equity release remains limited in most countries as reported in
Table 1, though mortgage equity extraction and reﬁnancing have become signiﬁcant at the
aggregate level in a few of them (e.g. U.S., U.K. and the Netherlands). In some cases, the
limited recourse to home equity release may reﬂect scarce availability of suitable mortgage
contracts (e.g. due to regulatory constraints). However, in most countries borrowers are
deterred from reﬁnancing their contracts by administrative obstacles and prohibitive trans-
action costs.5 In such countries, mortgage lending is likely to interact with interest rate and
house price developments only to a very limited extent (namely only for the new mortgage
contracts and not for the existing ones, which mostly reﬂect market conditions prevailing at
the time they were signed rather than current conditions). The U.S. has been historically
one of the main exceptions to this pattern, with the exceptional nature of the U.S. mortgage
market becoming particularly evident in recent years as U.S. borrowers have taken advan-
tage of low interest rates, high house prices and a dramatic decline in transaction costs to
engage in a wave of mortgage reﬁnancing and equity extraction commonly thought to be
large enough to inﬂuence aggregate spending.
2.2 House Prices and Consumption
In Table 3 we report the correlation between house prices and total private consumption
measured at the business cycle frequency for that subset of countries with reliable house price
data.6 While the correlation is generally positive, it is noticeable how it varies signiﬁcantly
across countries, ranging from 0.79 in the U.K. to almost zero in Italy.
A natural question is whether that correlation shows any signiﬁcant pattern against
the characteristics of mortgage markets. Figure 1 (1a to 1d) describes how the correla-
tion between consumption and house prices varies with four indicators of development and
ﬂexibility of mortgage markets: (i) mortgage to GDP ratio, (ii) home-ownership ratio, (iii)
the degree of completeness in mortgage markets proposed by Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003)
(MOW henceforth, which mainly measures the number of mortgage products available in a
5For instance, Borio (1996) documents the penalties and administrative costs that borrowers willing to
repay in advance their medium- and long-term (not necessarily mortgage) loans face in a number of countries.
6See Table 2 in the Appendix for the description of the house price data.
5given market)7 and (iv) the typical LTV ratio (LTV henceforth). Notice that the correlation
is signiﬁcant and increasing in all cases.
Table 4 shows how the correlation between house prices and consumption varies (on
average across countries) with (i) the possibility of resorting to mortgage reﬁnancing, and
(ii) the interest-rate mortgage structure. The correlation is on average twice as large in those
countries where mortgage reﬁnancing is feasible, and is also higher in those countries with
ap r e v a l e n c eo fvariable rate contracts.
2.3 Country Clustering
A further issue worth exploring is whether it is possible to identify “clusters” of countries
on the basis of the institutional characteristics of their mortgage markets. In general, in
countries where LTV ratios are high, the level of mortgage debt relative to GDP tends
to be large. High LTV ratios and large mortgage debts also tend to be accompanied by
relatively long durations. In addition, countries where home equity release is common and
households are able to borrow easily against their housing wealth tend to exhibit relatively
high mortgage debt to GDP ratios. By contrast, there is no clear correlation between home
ownership ratios and other characteristics, perhaps reﬂecting the prevailing role of public
policies and cultural factors in determining the diﬀusion of home ownership in a country.8
Likewise, there is no obvious link between the prevailing type of interest rate adjustment
and the relative size of the mortgage market or other institutional factors.
In general, mortgage markets tend to be larger and more ﬂexible in the Anglo-Saxon
economies than in Japan and continental Europe (with the exception of the Netherlands). In
particular, mortgage equity release is more extensively used in the U.S., U.K., Australia and
the Netherlands than in the other countries. This country split coincides with that between
countries with market- and bank-based ﬁnancial systems, suggesting that the extent to
which households can borrow against their housing wealth partly depends on the availability
of developed and well-functioning capital markets in which lenders can raise loanable funds
7Note that this index is only available for EU countries.
8Governments aiming to promote home ownership have historically intervened in a variety of ways, such
as the establishment of public housing ﬁnance agencies, the provision of deposit insurance to institutions
specialised in mortgage lending, regulation and direct provision by public authorities of rental housing,
welfare support to mortgage borrowers or ﬁscal incentives (e.g. the deductability of homeowners’ interest
payments).
6and transfer risks. It should be also noted that countries with market-based ﬁnancial systems
are typically those in which mortgage markets have been longer and more extensively exposed
to liberalisation and deregulation.
A more formal clustering exercise is pursued by Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), who group
various national mortgage markets according to a set of institutional characteristics such
as LTV ratios, the use of market or historical prices to value collateral and the extent
of home equity release. The authors argue that most continental European countries are
characterised by conservative lending practices and limited mortgage equity release, while
Anglo-Saxon countries are exposed to more aggressive practices and more extensive mortgage
equity release, particularly in countries where variable rate mortgages are predominant. The
main exceptions to this classiﬁcation are the Netherlands, Finland and Ireland among the
continental European countries and Canada among the Anglo-Saxon countries.
O v e r a l l ,w i t h i nt h eE Ut h e r ea p p e a r st ob ea tl e a s ttwo clusters of countries:
• ﬁrst, a group with less developed and more regulated mortgage markets (Italy, Ger-
many, Austria, Belgium) where mortgage debt to GDP ratios tend to be low;
• second, a group of countries with deregulated mortgage markets and high mortgage
debt to GDP ratios where home equity extraction is common (notably, the Netherlands,
the U.K. and Denmark).
Other countries such as France and Spain fall under intermediate categories or may be
undergoing structural adjustments that render their categorisation more diﬃcult (e.g. Spain
which has been exposed to signiﬁcant ﬁnancial innovation in recent years).
3 The Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks in EU
Countries, the U.S. and Canada: a VAR Analysis
Institutional diﬀerences across mortgage markets are often cited as a likely source of cross-
country diﬀerences in the speed and strength of the transmission of monetary policy impulses
to the economy. The size and distribution of household mortgage debt, average maturity of
contracts and type of interest rate adjustment are usually listed among the characteristics
likely to determine the extent of the income and collateral eﬀects induced by changes in
7interest rates. In particular, a higher share of variable rate mortgages is generally expected
to be conducive to a stronger "housing channel" and, ultimately, to a more eﬀective monetary
transmission mechanism (Debelle (2004)).
BIS (1995) concludes that monetary policy could be expected to have comparatively
stronger eﬀects in Anglo-Saxon countries than in continental Europe (with the possible ex-
ception of Italy, where variable-rate mortgages predominate). Borio (1996) notes that this
split coincides with that between countries with more or less developed ﬁnancial structures,
though this does not amount to conclusive evidence. Iacoviello (2004) relates variations in
the magnitude of output responses to monetary policy shocks across European countries
to diﬀerences in ﬁnancial systems. Likewise, Angeloni et al. (2004) refer to institutional
diﬀerences in housing ﬁnance as one possible explanation for the more muted response of
private consumption to monetary policy shocks in the Euro Area compared with the U.S..
In recent years, the remarkable heterogeneity in private consumption developments between
some continental European countries and most Anglo-Saxon countries at a time of (com-
mon) worldwide low interest rates has seemed to provide further conﬁrmation about the
importance of structural diﬀerences in mortgage markets across countries in determining the
strength of the housing channel.
In this section we estimate VAR models for three Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, the
U.S. and the U.K.), seven euro area countries (Germany, Italy, France, Spain, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and Austria) plus a non-euro area EU member country with a highly devel-
oped mortgage market (Denmark).9 Given the more sophisticated nature of the Anglo-Saxon
and Danish housing ﬁnance systems, they provide a natural benchmark against which to as-
sess the potential implications of less ﬂexible institutional settings in euro area countries.10
We estimate the model on quarterly data over a sample period from 1980:1 to 2004:4
(except from 1986 for Austria due to data availability). Each VAR model includes ﬁve
endogenous variables: (i) real total private consumption, (ii) the consumer price index (CPI);
(iii) real house prices (deﬂated using the CPI); (iv) the 3-month nominal interest rate, and
9Note that we include all major industrialised countries in our analysis with the exception of Japan, for
which a measure of monetary policy shock may be particularly problematic due to the zero interest rate
policy from the mid 1990s to the end of the sample period.
10In particular, the US and the UK are characterised by relatively more developed and ﬂexible mortgage
markets, with the main contractual diﬀerence perhaps being the diﬀerent type of mortgage lending rate
adjustment (ﬁxed in the US versus variable in the UK).
8(v) the real eﬀective exchange rate. We include the real eﬀective exchange rate to cater for
open economy inﬂuences that, while arguably secondary for the U.S. economy, are likely to
matter considerably for the European countries and Canada. For the U.S., which is a large
closed economy, we also estimate the model without the real eﬀective exchange rate. Since
this speciﬁcation turns out to be better than the one including the exchange rate according
to standard information criteria and the signiﬁcance of the impulse responses, we select this
one in the baseline exercise.
The VARs are speciﬁed in levels (hence long-run relationships are implicitly allowed for)
and, with the exception of the interest rates, all variables are in logs. A constant and a linear
trend are also added as exogenous variables. Based on the Schwartz information criterion, a
lag order of two (in levels) is optimal for this model across all countries.
The VAR models include house prices since they are of direct relevance to the household
sector and the housing market.11 However, the lack of harmonised data on house prices has
to be emphasised. Table 2 reports a detailed description of the data used in this study, which
indicates a certain degree of heterogeneity in the available house price data available. Even
within the euro area house price data are not fully comparable. For this reason, the results
have to be interpreted with some caution.
The identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shocks is achieved through a standard recursive
procedure based on a Cholesky factorisation of the estimated variance-covariance matrix.
The policy-related variable - the 3-month nominal interest rate - is ordered after all other
variables, except the exchange rate (changes in the ordering of the latter, however, do not
aﬀect the main results shown below).
Figure 2 reports the impulse responses of private consumption and of the real house
price to a 100 basis points rise in the policy interest rate, for all considered countries.
Qualitatively, the impact of a policy shock is in line with previous studies for U.S., Canada
and EA countries (Angeloni et al., 2004, Aoki et al., 2004, and Mojon and Peersman, 2003):
both consumption and the real house price tend to fall. However, a noticeable result of the
VAR analysis is the signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the impact of a monetary policy shock across
diﬀerent countries. For example, there is a striking diﬀerence between the impact of a policy
11Giuliodori (2004) conducts a similar analysis for several EU countries, ﬁnding similar results to this
study. Note that, due to data limitations, we have not included another highly relevant variable in the
VARs, i.e., mortgage debt.
9shock in France, where the eﬀects are very small and almost statistically insigniﬁcant, and
the impact in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where the eﬀects are very large
(indeed larger than in the U.S.). In Germany, the eﬀects are even of the "wrong" sign,
although this may be partly due to the impact of the German reuniﬁcation (see also Mojon
and Peersman (2003)).
The ﬁnding that monetary policy transmission seems to be stronger in countries like
the U.K., the Netherlands and the U.S., and weaker in France and Germany, may indeed
suggest a link with the degree of development in mortgage markets. To further explore this
issue, in Figures 3 and 4 we plot the estimated peak response of private consumption and
the real house price to a standardised monetary policy shock in the cross-section of countries
respectively against four indicators:
(i) mortgage debt to GDP ratio;
(ii) degree of home ownership;
(iii) MOW index of completeness in mortgage markets;
(iv) typical LTV ratio.
In all cases, we ﬁnd a clearly positive relationship. In particular, in the case of the MOW
index the link appears to be quite strong, especially as regards the eﬀects of monetary policy
on real house prices.
In Table 5 we also relate the (cross-country) average estimated peak eﬀects of a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock on private consumption and real house price to two dummy
indicators: (i) the use of mortgage reﬁnancing and (ii) the interest rate structure (predom-
inantly ﬁxed or variable interest rate). In line with the previous results, we ﬁnd a compar-
atively stronger reaction of both consumption and the real house price to a policy shock in
c o u n t r i e sw i t hav a r i a b l er a t es t r u c t u r ea n d ,e v e nm o r em a r k e d l y ,w h e r em o r t g a g er e ﬁnanc-
ing is used. For example, the peak response of the real house price is 1.82 per cent where
mortgage reﬁnancing is allowed, and only 0.38 per cent where reﬁnancing is not allowed or
not practiced.
Summary of Empirical Evidence: Why is Consumption More Responsive in
More Flexible Mortgage Markets? Overall, the empirical analysis seems to convey a
suﬃciently robust general message: both the business-cycle link between private consumption
and house prices, as well as the transmission of monetary policy shocks on consumption and
10house prices, seem to be signiﬁcantly related to the characteristics of mortgage markets
in diﬀerent countries. In particular, house prices and private consumption co-move more
strongly, and monetary policy seems more powerful (on consumer spending and house prices)
in countries with more developed/ﬂexible mortgage markets.
Two observations are relevant at this stage. First, a more structural investigation of
the link between mortgage markets characteristics and the transmission of monetary policy
shocks requires a modelling framework. Second, the fact that private spending is more
responsive to monetary impulses in economies with more developed credit/mortgage markets
may be perceived as a puzzle. In fact, a priori, one may believe that more developed ﬁnancial
markets allow households to smooth consumption more eﬃciently. In the following, we
present a model in which a fraction of agents, in equilibrium, do not choose to behave as
permanent-income consumers. Rather, for these agents, it is optimal to increase consumption
in light of any given rise in income. They can do this by increasing borrowing, although up
to some endogenously determined limit. Thus, in a context where credit markets allow to
convert asset values (e.g., housing) into borrowing and therefore consumption more easily,
consumption itself should be in principle more responsive to underlying shocks. We describe
our model in the next section.
4 The Model
The economy is composed of a continuum of households in the interval (0,1).A si nI a c o v i e l l o
(2005) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2004), there are two types of households, named bor-
rowers and savers, of measure ω and 1 − ω respectively. Each household’s time endowment
is normalized to one. There are also two sectors, producing a durable good (identiﬁed as new
housing) and non-durable goods respectively. In each sector there are competitive produc-
ers of a ﬁnal good and monopolistic competitive producers of intermediate goods, with the
latter hiring labour from the borrowers. The two types of households feature heterogeneous
preferences, with the borrowers being more impatient than the savers, so that their marginal
utility of consumption exceeds the marginal utility of saving.12 Both borrowers and savers
derive utility from consumption of the non-durable ﬁnal good and from housing services.
12For previous examples of saver-borrower models, see Becker (1980), Becker and Foias (1987), Krusell
and Smith (1993), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
11Notice that debt accumulation reﬂects intertemporal equilibrium trading between the two
agents. Borrowers are subject to a collateral constraint, with the borrowing limit tied to the
value of the existing stock of housing.
4.1 Final Good Producers
In each sector (j = c,d) a perfectly competitive ﬁnal good producer purchases Yt,j(i) units of
intermediate good i.T h eﬁnal good producer in sector j operates the production function:
Yj,t ≡
µZ 1
0
Yj,t(i)
εj−1
εj di
¶
εj
εj−1
(1)
where Yj,t(i) is quantity demanded of the intermediate good i by ﬁnal good producer j,a n d
εj is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated varieties in sector j.N o t i c e , i n
particular, that in the durable good sector Yd,t(i) refers to expenditure in the new durable
intermediate good i (rather than services). Maximization of proﬁts yields demand functions
for the typical intermediate good i in sector j:
Yj,t(i)=
µ
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t
¶−εj
Yj,t j = c,d (2)
for all i.I n p a r t i c u l a r , Pj,t ≡
³R 1
0 Pj,t(i)1−εjdi
´ 1
1−εj is the price index consistent with the
ﬁnal good producer in sector j e a r n i n gz e r op r o ﬁts.13
4.2 Borrowers
A typical borrower consumes an index of consumption services of housing and non-durable
ﬁnal goods, deﬁned as:
Xt ≡
h
(1 − α)
1
η (Ct)
η−1
η + α
1
η (Dt)
η−1
η
i η
η−1
(3)
where Ct denotes (non-durable) consumption services, Dt denotes housing services at the
end of period t, α>0 is the share of housing services in the composite consumption index,
13Hence the problem of the ﬁnal good producer j is: max Pj,tYj,t −
R 1
0 Pj,t(i)Yj,t(i)di subject to (1).
12and η>0 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing services.14
The borrower maximizes the following utility program
E0
(
∞ X
t=0
β
tU(Xt,N t)
)
(4)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints (in nominal terms):
Pc,t Ct + Pd,t(Dt − (1 − δ)Dt−1)+R
m
t−1Bt−1 = Bt + WtNt + Tt (5)
where Bt is end-of-period t net nominal debt, and Rm
t−1 is the nominal lending rate on debt
contracts stipulated at time t − 1 with maturity m.F u r t h e r m o r e ,Wt is the nominal wage,
Nt is labor supply, and Tt are net government transfers. Labor is assumed to be perfectly
mobile across sectors, implying that the nominal wage rate is common across sectors.
In real terms (units of non-durable consumption), (5) reads
Ct + qt(Dt − (1 − δ)Dt−1)+
Rm
t−1bt−1
πc,t
= bt +
Wt
Pc,t
Nt +
Tt
Pc,t
(6)
where qt ≡
Pd,t
Pc,t is the relative price of housing, and bt ≡ Bt
Pc,t is real debt. Notice that, as a
consequence of debt being predetermined in nominal terms, variations in inﬂation aﬀect the
real ex-post cost of debt service, and therefore borrower’s net worth.
Later we will work with the following speciﬁcation of the utility function
U(Xt,N t)=l o g ( Xt) −
v
1+ϕ
N
1+ϕ
t
where ϕ is the inverse elasticity of labor supply and v is a scale parameter.
Variable vs. Fixed-Rate Contracts The interest rate Rm
t on a mortgage contract
of maturity m is related to the policy rates Rt+k (k =0 ,1,2...) via the term-structure
equation:
14To deﬁne a utility-based aggregate price index one needs to assume the existence of an additional ﬁnal
good producer, whose task consists in assembling housing and consumption services via the production
function (3). The price index consistent with maximization of proﬁts by this producer would read:
Pt ≡
£
(1 − α)( Pc,t)1−η + α (Pd,t)1−η¤ 1
1−η
13R
m
t =
Ã
m−1 X
k=0
τ
k
!−1 m−1 X
k=0
τ
kEt {Rt+k} (7)
with τ ∈ [0,1].
In the case m =1the mortgage and policy rates coincide. Mortgage contracts are
typically multi-period. Multi-period loan contracts can be deﬁned as at variable rate (i.e.,
contracts tied to the short-term policy rate), or at ﬁxed rate (tied to a long-term interest
rate) depending on the value of τ.F o r τ =0the mortgage rate is perfectly indexed to the
policy rate, while for τ =1it is ﬁxed to the m-period interest rate. We assume that the
decision on who bears the interest rate risk (either the borrower or the saver) mainly reﬂects
institutional factors which lie outside the scope of our model.15
Collateral Constraint Private borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint. We
assume that the whole stock of debt is collateralized by the value of the accumulated stock
of housing. By deﬁnition, if the collateral value depreciates at the same rate of physical
depreciation δ, we would write the accumulated equity value at time t as:
Pd,tDt =
"
∞ X
s=0
(1 − δ)
s(Dt−s − (1 − δ)Dt−1−s)
#
Pd,t
More generally, and as in Campbell and Hercowitz (2004), we allow for the collateral value
to depreciate economically at a rate ξ higher than physical depreciation, and therefore write
the collateral constraint as:
Bt ≤ (1 − χ)
"
∞ X
s=0
(1 − ξ)
s(Dt−s − (1 − δ)Dt−1−s)
#
Pd,t (8)
=( 1 − χ)Pd,t(Dt − (1 − δ)Dt−1)+( 1− ξ)Bt−1
Pd,t
Pd,t−1
where χ is the fraction of the housing value that cannot be used as a collateral, and where
ξ ≥ δ. A constraint of this kind can be justiﬁed on the basis of limited enforcement.16 Since
the borrower can run away with the assets in case of default, requiring a collateral ex-ante
15For a normative analysis see Campbell and Cocco (2003).
16Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
14acts against that temptation. One can think of parameters χ and ξ as being determined
by institutional factors prevailing in the credit market. For one, χ can be deﬁned as the
down-payment rate (or inverse LTV ratio), and therefore represents a direct measure of the
ﬂexibility of the mortgage market (Jappelli and Pagano (1989)). As already discussed above,
the value of χ may reﬂect legal and regulatory constraints changing across countries (see
Table 1).
Parameter ξ can be deﬁned as the rate at which a good loses its value as collateral
to the creditor. In the mortgage markets, ξ may capture the eﬀe c to fa l lt h o s es u p p l y - s i d e
factors that inﬂuence the ability of households to reﬁnance their existing mortgages or to use
their housing wealth to release liquidity.17 For instance, lower values of ξ closer to δ —a n d
hence a better performance of the housing stock as a collateral in a lending relationship — may
reﬂect technological, industrial and structural developments in the banking sector that render
mortgage reﬁnancing easier and less costly, thereby lengthening debt repayment. Bennett
et al. (2001) argue that the increase in the propensity to mortgage reﬁnancing observed in
the U.S. in the 1990s was due to a combination of technological, structural and regulatory
changes that rendered mortgage markets more competitive and eﬃcient, thereby lowering
the transaction costs associated with reﬁnancing. An example may be developments in
the information and banking technology available to lending institutions in order to process
information on the creditworthiness of borrowers or to manage the risks associated with their
mortgage portfolios (e.g., through the securitisation of mortgage loans or the use of credit
derivatives). In addition, the liberalisation and deregulation of mortgage markets, with
the ensuing product innovation and increase in competitive pressures, may also lower the
value of ξ. Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) analyse the house price boom of the late 1980s
in the U.K. and note that ﬁnancial liberalisation rendered illiquid assets more spendable
and allowed households to increase their leverage ratios. Girouard and Blöndal (2001) and
Debelle (2004) also describe the impact of ﬁnancial liberalisation and deregulation on the
easing of borrowing constraints in more recent episodes in various OECD countries.
We will distinguish two alternative scenarios for the calibration of ξ:
17See Campbell and Cocco (2003) for a normative analysis of the optimal choice between a variable-rate
and a ﬁxed-rate mortgage contract based on household-level risk management, and Krainer and Masquis
(2003) for a model of optimal reﬁnancing of a ﬁxed-rate mortgage depending on house prices and interest
rates. We leave for future research the task of embedding an explicit reﬁnancing choice into the model.
15• ξ = δ (baseline). In this case, the rate of repayment coincides with the rate of economic
depreciation of housing. This scenario is akin to one of full mortgage reﬁnancing.
• ξ>δ .I nt h i ss c e n a r i oξ will assume alternative values depending on the typical average
duration of the mortgage contract (see Table 1 and below for the parameterization).
Finally, notice that movements in real house prices aﬀect the ability of borrowing. This
assumption is consistent with the evidence that equity valuation eﬀects have been important
for the recent business cycle evolution in some OECD countries, in which the link between
house price ﬂuctuations and ability of borrowing has played a major role in supporting
household consumption.18
Assuming that, in a neighborhood of the deterministic steady state, equation (5) is
always satisﬁed with the equality, we can rewrite the collateral constraint in real terms (i.e.,
in units of consumption) as follows
bt =( 1− χ) qt(Dt − (1 − δ)Dt−1)+( 1 − ξ)bt−1
qt
qt−1
(9)
Notice that, in this speciﬁcation, both the level and the rate of change of qt aﬀect the ability
of borrowing.
Given {b0, D−1} the borrower chooses {Nt,b t, Dt,C t} to maximize (4) subject to (6)
and (9). By deﬁning λt and λtψt as the multipliers on constraints (6) and (9) respectively,
and Ui,t as the marginal utility of variable i,e ﬃciency conditions read:
−Un,t
Uc,t
=
Wt
Pc,t
(10)
Uc,t = λt (11)
Uc,tZt = Ud,t + β(1 − δ)Et {Uc,t+1Zt+1} (12)
18On the other hand, we are not explicitly allowing for the presence of home equity loans (otherwise deﬁned
as home mortgage loans). These are typically secondary loans for which accumulated equity (deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the value of the outstanding housing stock and the debt principal still due) is used as a
collateral. Allowing for home equity loans would not qualitatively alter our results.
16ψt =1− βEt
½
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
Rm
t
πc,t+1
¾
+( 1− ξ)βEt
½
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
ψt+1
qt+1
qt
¾
(13)
where
Zt ≡ qt [1 − (1 − χ)ψt]
can be deﬁned as the "eﬀective" relative price of housing. The latter depends directly on
the real price of housing qt, and inversely on the shadow value ψt of relaxing the collateral
constraint.
4.2.1 Interpretation
Equation (10) governs the consumption/leisure margin, while (11) equates the marginal
utility of consumption to the shadow value of the ﬂow budget constraint (5). Equation
(12) is an intertemporal condition driving the choice between housing and consumption.
It requires the borrower to equate the marginal utility of current consumption (left-hand
side) to the marginal gain of housing services (right-hand side). The latter depends on
two components: (i) the direct utility gain of an additional unit of housing; and (ii) the
expected utility stemming from the possibility of expanding future consumption by means
of the realized resale value of a new unit of housing purchased in the previous period.
Equation (13) is a modiﬁed version of an Euler equation. Indeed it reduces to a standard
Euler condition in the case of ψt =0for all t. The shadow value of relaxing the collateral
constraint ψt is tied to a payoﬀ which has two components. The ﬁrst is the current deviation
from the standard Euler condition. When that component is positive the marginal utility of
consumption exceeds the (expected) marginal utility of shifting consumption intertemporally.
Hence the borrower has a marginal beneﬁt from acquiring a unit of housing and purchase
additional current consumption via a relaxation of the collateral constraint. The second term
in (13) indicates that the shadow value of borrowing depends also on the ability of expanding
future consumption, which is proportional to the rate at which the housing asset depreciates.
The lower ξ, the larger the rate at which borrowers can expand private borrowing at each
time t. In general, a unit of housing acquired in time t allows to expand future borrowing
(and consumption) at a rate (1 − ξ)j in period t + j. In this respect, ξ can be thought of
capturing (exogenous) variations in the rate of mortgage reﬁnancing.
17The Euler Gap Integrating both (12) and (13) forward, and combining, we can
express the margin between consumption and housing in more compact form as
Uc,tqt = Et
(
∞ X
j=0
[β(1 − δ)]
j Ud,t+j
)
+( 1 − χ)Uc,tqtψt (14)
= Et
(
∞ X
j=0
[β(1 − δ)]
j Ud,t+j
)
+( 1 − χ)Et
(
∞ X
j=0
[β(1 − ξ)]
j qt+j∆t+j
)
(15)
where ∆t ≡ Uc,t−βUc,t+1
Rm
t
πc,t+1 is a term summarizing the deviation from the Euler condition
in any given time t.W el a b e l∆t the Euler gap. In (14), the marginal utility of consumption
is equated to an alternative representation of the marginal utility of housing. The latter has
two dynamic components. First, the current and expected future ﬂow of utility of housing
services. This term is standard in a framework with free borrowing. Second, the current
and expected future beneﬁts deriving from the possibility of expanding (current and future)
consumption by means of increased borrowing. Indeed those beneﬁts coincide with positive
v a l u e so ft h eE u l e rg a p ,w h i c hi nt u r nr e ﬂect proportional variations in the tightness of
the collateral constraint captured by the multiplier ψt. Notice that, in this interpretation,
(1 − χ)(1 − ξ)j is the eﬀective rate at which the household can expand borrowing at any
time t + j,w i t hj ≥ 0.
4.3 The Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission
In this environment the transmission of monetary policy shocks works primarily via three
channels: (i) a nominal-debt channel, stemming from private debt being non-indexed and
predetermined in nominal terms; (ii) a collateral-constraint channel, working via ﬂuctuations
in the shadow value of borrowing; and (iii) an asset-price channel, stemming from real
house prices aﬀecting the collateral value. It is important to emphasize that, conditional on
monetary policy shocks, channel (i) and (ii) work independently of the presence of nominal
price rigidity, although the strength of those channels can be aﬀected by the degree of price
stickiness.
Nominal Debt Channel With private debt being predetermined in nominal terms,
ﬂuctuations in current (non-durable) inﬂation aﬀe c tt h er e a le x - p o s tc o s to fd e b ts e r v i c e .
18This is clear from the borrower’s budget constraint (6). This eﬀect is akin to an income
eﬀect. For instance, a policy tightening, by rising the real cost of debt service, will induce
the borrower to decrease spending in both consumption and housing.
Collateral-Constraint Channel Equilibrium ﬂuctuations in the shadow value of
borrowing ψt are key to the transmission of policy shocks on consumption. To clarify this,
notice that, because of durability, the term
P∞
j=0 [β(1 − δ)]
j Ud,t+j in (14) can be thought of
as being roughly constant. In fact, suppose δ were equal to 1 (i.e., no durability). In this case,
variations in the shadow value of housing would be driven entirely by the current marginal
utility of housing services. For values of δ suﬃciently below 1, though, variations in the
marginal utility of housing services in the distant future matter substantially for the current
shadow value.19 This argument applies a fortiori to our environment, given the extremely
low rate of physical depreciation of housing.
The above consideration allows to rewrite (14) as:
Uc,tqt ' const. +( 1− χ)Et
(
∞ X
j=0
[β(1 − ξ)]
j qt+j∆t+j
)
(16)
Variations in the present discounted value of the Euler gap are the speciﬁc feature character-
izing the monetary transmission under a collateral constraint. Consider a monetary policy
contraction, in the form of an interest rate hike. This induces a tightening of the collateral
constraint via two channels: ﬁrst, and regardless of price stickiness, via an eﬀect of debt
inﬂation (see above); second, but only in the presence of price stickiness, via a rise in the
real interest rate. Formally, as a result, ψt must rise, for the shadow value of relaxing the
constraint is higher in the presence of a heightened service cost of debt. In this respect, ψt
bears the genuine interpretation of an asset price. From (13), in fact, a rise in the shadow
value ψt signals positive current and expected future variations in the Euler gap. Yet, in
equation (16), a rise in the right-hand side implies that, for any given relative price qt,t h e
marginal utility of consumption Uc,t must rise. Hence, in turn, consumption must fall.
This interpretation clariﬁes the role of the institutional parameters χ and ξ.F o r t h e
borrower, the policy contraction amounts to a negative shock to real income. A rise in the
shadow value ψt signals exactly this eﬀect. Recall that the borrower behaves in exactly
19See also Barsky et al. (2006).
19the opposite way to a standard permanent-income consumer. In fact, the borrower would
like to decrease (increase) borrowing in light of a negative (positive) income shock (whereas
the permanent-income consumer would instead obey to consumption-smoothing). A lower
(higher) down-payment rate χ and/or a lower repayment rate ξ, both representative of a
"more (less) ﬂexible" mortgage market, entail that a larger (smaller) variation in consump-
tion is needed to satisfy (16) for any given variation in ψt (i.e., for any given impact on the
tightness of the collateral constraint). Intuitively, in times of negative (positive) shocks to
real income, a more ﬂexible mortgage market allows to decrease (increase) borrowing more
rapidly, with this eﬀect translating proportionally into a variation in consumption.
Asset-Price Channel Finally, movements in real house prices qt also aﬀect the trans-
mission of monetary policy shocks, by aﬀecting the value of the housing stock that can be
used as a collateral. Fluctuations in that value aﬀect the tightness of the collateral constraint.
In our two-sector model, however, this eﬀe c ti so p e r a t i v eo n l yi nt h ec a s eo fasymmetric price
stickiness. With prices ﬂexible in both sectors, in fact, real house prices would remain un-
changed in response to a monetary policy shock. Under our baseline assumption that house
prices are ﬂexible and non-durable prices sticky, however, a policy tightening will induce
a fall in real house prices, thereby inducing (all else equal) a depreciation of the collateral
value and a further tightening of the collateral constraint. In turn, this will induce a fall in
the demand for borrowing, and therefore a fall in the demand for housing, which will further
depress its relative price, all in a self-reinforcing fashion.
In this respect, the asset-price channel works by strengthening the impact of the collateral-
constraint channel. In equation (16), in fact, a fall in qt requires an even larger increase in
the marginal utility of consumption in order to match any given variation of the tightness
of the collateral constraint represented by the right-hand side of (16).
4.4 Savers
We assume that the savers are the owners of the monopolistic ﬁrms in each sector. A typical
saver maximizes the utility program
E0
(
∞ X
t=0
γ
tU(e Ct, e Dt)
)
(17)
20Importantly, the (im)patience rate γ is such that γ>β . The saver’s sequence of budget
constraints reads (in nominal terms):
Pc,t e Ct + Pd,t(e Dt − (1 − δ)e Dt−1)+R
m
t−1 e Bt−1 = e Bt + e Tt + e Γj,t (18)
where e Ct is saver’s consumption, e Dt is saver’s housing services at the end of period t, e Bt is
nominal debt (credit) at the end-of-period t , e Tt are net government transfers, and e Γj,t are
nominal proﬁts from the holding of monopolistic competitive ﬁrms in sector j. We assume
that the savers’ labor supply is rigid. Given any initial distribution of wealth, in fact, the
savers will end-up owning all ﬁnancial assets in the steady state. This would insure a ﬂow
of ﬁnancial income that would induce them, in equilibrium, to work only a small fraction
of their time endowment. Quantitatively, then, their labor supply choice would impact very
little on aggregate ﬂuctuations.
Eﬃciency conditions for the saver’s program read:
e Uc,t = γEt
(
e Uc,t+1
πc,t+1
R
m
t
)
(19)
qt =
e Ud,t
e Uc,t
+ γ(1 − δ)Et
(
e Uc,t+1
e Uc,t
qt+1
)
(20)
4.5 Production and Pricing of Intermediate Goods
Intermediate-good ﬁrm i in sector j hires labor (supplied by the borrowers) to operate a
linear production function:
Yj,t(i)=ωNj,t(i) (21)
where, for simplicity, labor productivity is assumed to be constant and normalized to 1 in
both sectors. Each ﬁrm i has monopolistic power in the production of its own variety and
therefore has leverage in setting the price. In so doing it faces a quadratic cost proportional
to output, and equal to
ϑj
2
µ
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t−1(i)
− 1
¶2
Yj,t (22)
21where the parameter ϑj measures the degree of sectoral nominal price rigidity. The higher
ϑj, the more sluggish the adjustment of nominal prices in sector j.F o r ϑj =0prices are
ﬂexible.
The problem of each monopolistic ﬁrm is to choose the sequence {Nj,t(i),P j,t(i)}
∞
t=0 to
maximize expected discounted nominal proﬁts:
E0
(
∞ X
t=0
Λj,t
Ã
Pj,t(i)Yj,t(i) − WtNj,t(i) −
ϑj
2
µ
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t−1(i)
− 1
¶2
Pj,tYj,t
!)
(23)
subject to (21). In (23), Λj,t ≡ γEt
n
h λt+1
h λt
o
is the saver’s stochastic discount factor, and e λt
is the saver’s marginal utility of nominal income. Let’s denote by
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t t h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo f
variety i in sector j.I nasymmetric equilibrium in which
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t =1for all i and j,a n da l l
ﬁrms employ the same amount of labor in each sector, the ﬁrst order condition of the above
problem reads:
((1 − εj)+εjmcj,t)=ϑj (πj,t − 1)πj,t (24)
−ϑjEt
½
Λj,t+1
Λj,t
Pj,t+1
Pj,t
Yj,t+1
Yj,t
(πj,t+1 − 1)πj,t+1
¾
(j = c,d)
where πj,t ≡
Pj,t
Pj,t−1 is the gross inﬂation rate in sector j,a n d
mcj,t ≡
Wt
Pj,t
(25)
is the real marginal cost in sector j.
In the particular case of ﬂexible prices, the sectoral real marginal cost must be constant
and equal to the inverse steady-state markup
εj−1
εj . By using (10), the pricing condition (24)
reads:
−Un,t
Uc,t
=
εc − 1
εc
if j = c (26)
−Un,t
Uc,t
q
−1
t =
εd − 1
εd
if j = d (27)
224.6 Market clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market of sector j = c,d requires that the production of the ﬁnal
good be allocated to total households’ expenditure and to resource costs originating from
the adjustment of prices
Yc,t = ωCt +( 1− ω)e Ct +
ϑc
2
(πc,t − 1)
2 ωYc,t (28)
Yd,t = ω(Dt − (1 − δ)Dt−1)+( 1− ω)
³
e Dt − (1 − δ)e Dt−1
´
(29)
where
Yj,t ≡
Z 1
0
Yj,t(i) di = ω
Z 1
0
Nj,t(i) di = ωNj,t (j = c,d)
Equilibrium in the debt and labor market requires respectively
ωBt +( 1− ω)e Bt =0 (30)
X
j
Nj,t = Nt (31)
4.7 Monetary Policy
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of an interest rate reaction function,
constrained to be linear in the logs of the relevant arguments:
ln
µ
Rt
R
¶
=( 1 − φr)φπ ln
³πj,t
π
´
(32)
+φr ln
µ
Rt−1
R
¶
+ εt
where Rt is the short-term policy rate, and εt is a policy shock evolving
εt =e x p ( εt−1)
ρ + ut
with ut˜i.i.d..
234.8 Equilibrium
An (imperfectly) competitive allocation, with sticky prices in the non-durable sector, is a
sequence for Nt,N c,t,N d,t,b t,D t,C t, e Ct, πc,t, πd,t, Rt, Rm,t, ψt,q t, mct satisfying (6), (7),
(9), (10)-(13), (19), (24), (28), (29), (31), (32).
5 Deterministic Steady State
In the deterministic steady state, as a result of heterogeneity in patience rates, the shadow
value of relaxing the collateral constraint is always positive. This prevents the borrower
from accumulating debt indeﬁnitely (until labor income resources have been exhausted).
The borrower will then always choose to hold a positive amount of debt. To show this we
simply combine the steady-state version of (19), which implies R = πc
β , with (13), obtaining:
ψ =
1 −
β
γ
[1 − (1 − ξ)β]
> 0 (33)
Notice that, to insure a well-deﬁned steady state, both heterogeneity in patience rates
and a borrowing limit are required. In fact, if discount rates were equal, the steady-state
level of debt would be indeterminate (Becker (1980), Becker and Foias (1987)). In this
case, in fact, it would hold
β
γ = βRR =1 , and the economy would display a well-known
problem of dependence of the steady state on the initial conditions.20 With diﬀerent discount
rates, and yet still free borrowing, the consumption path of the borrower would be tilted
downward, and the ratio of consumption to income would asymptotically shrink to zero.21
Hence a binding collateral constraint allows a constant consumption path to be compatible
with heterogeneity in discount rates.
In a ﬂexible-price steady state for both sectors, taking the ratio of (26) and (27) the
relative price of housing reads
q =
εd−1
εd
εc−1
εc
≡ q (34)
20In other words, under β = γ, the economy would constantly replicate the initial (arbitrary) distribution
of wealth forever.
21In this case the assumption β<γis equivalent to βRR < 1. In the absence of exogenous growth, this
implies that the (gross) growth rate of consumption (βRR) is below the (gross) growth rate of income (which
is 1). Hence, the ratio of consumption to output must shrink over time.
24By evaluating (12) in the steady state we obtain the borrower’s ratio between the stock
of housing and consumption
D
C
=
α
1 − α
[Z (1 − β(1 − δ))]
−η ≡
µ
D
C
¶
(35)
which is decreasing in the eﬀective relative price of housing Z ≡ q
µ
1 −
(1−χ)(1−
β
γ)
[1−(1−ξ)β]
¶
.
The borrower’s steady-state leverage ratio reads:
b
D
=
(1 − χ)δ
1 − (1 − ξ)
(36)
Notice that both a lower down-payment rate χ and a lower repayment rate ξ increase the
borrower’s leverage ratio.
To pin down the level of debt we proceed as follows. We set parameter v in order to pin
down a certain level of hours worked in steady state (N = N). By combining (6), (9) and
(36) we can write:
D =
N εc−1
εc
Ω
(37)
where Ω ≡
¡
C
D
¢
+ δ
³
q +
(1−γ)(1−χ)
γξ
´
.
Once obtained D from (37), using (36), one can solve for the unique steady-state level
of borrower’s debt
b =
(1 − χ)N
1 − (1 − ξ)µcΩ
≡ b (38)
It is easy to show that, under the assumption β<γ , the steady-state level of debt b is stable,
i.e., the economy will converge to b starting from any initial value diﬀerent from b.
6 Institutional Factors and Sensitivity to Policy Shocks
In this section we evaluate how the transmission of monetary policy shocks is aﬀected by
three key institutional features:
• down-payment rate χ
25• repayment rate ξ
• mortgage structure (ﬁxed vs. variable debt contract)
6.1 Calibration
We resort to the following calibration. Time is in quarters. We set the quarterly discount
factor γ =0 .99 >β=0 .96. This value is in the range between values respectively chosen
by Krusell and Smith (1998) and estimated by Iacoviello (2005). The annual real interest
rate is pinned down by the saver’s patience rate and is equal to 4%. The annual physical
depreciation rate for housing is generally low, and around 1% per year. Therefore we set
δ =0 .01/4 as a baseline value. The elasticity of substitution between varieties is 7.5,w h i c h
yields a steady-state mark-up of 15%. We assume throughout that house prices are ﬂexible22
while we set the stickiness parameter for consumer prices equal to a benchmark value of
ϑc =7 6 . To pin down this value we proceed as follows. Let θ be the probability of not
resetting prices in the standard Calvo-Yun model. We parameterize 1
1−θ =4 , which implies
θ =0 .75, and therefore an average frequency of price adjustment of one year. This value is
roughly in line with the micro-based evidence for European countries summarized in Alvarez
et al. (2006) and Angeloni et al. (2006). Log-linearization of (24) around a zero-inﬂation
steady state (in the consumption sector) yields a slope of the Phillips curve equal to εc−1
ϑc .
Setting the elasticity ε equal to 7.5, which implies a steady-state markup of 15 percent, the
resulting stickiness parameter satisﬁes ϑc =
θ(ε−1)
(1−θ)(1−βθ) =2 0 .
The current share of housing and housing-related expenditure is about 10% on average
in the euro area. However, by adding owner-occupied housing that number would increase to
17.5%. Since we do not have rents in the model, we calibrate the share α in order to match
the expenditure for owner-occupied housing. The latter value is estimated as being 7.5% in
the euro area and 24% in the U.S., although statistical methodologies diﬀer substantially.
We choose to pick an intermediate value of α =1 6 % .
22Our results do not hinge critically on the assumed relative degree of stickiness between house and
consumption prices. See Monacelli (2006) for an analysis on this point. At the same time, the assumption
that house prices are more ﬂexible than consumption prices seems reasonable. For one, house prices tend
to incorporate an asset-price behavior. In addition, as argued in Barsky et al. (2006), house prices, unlike
consumption prices, are largely subject to negotiation upon transactions. Even the common perception that
house prices are sticky downward is probably misguided.
26T h ed o w n - p a y m e n tr a t ei ss e ta tχ =0 .3 i nt h eb a s e l i n ec a l i b r a t i o n ,av a l u ew h i c hi s
close to the euro area average, corresponding to a LTV ratio of about 0.7. Below, however,
we experiment with alternative values of this parameter.
As to the repayment rate ξ, in the baseline scenario we set ξ = δ, and interpret this case
as the one of full mortgage reﬁnancing. Alternatively we link the quarterly repayment rate
to the average duration of the loan. Table 1 shows that, within the European countries, the
average duration ranges between 15 and 30 years. In the table below we summarize how the
value of ξ changes depending on the speciﬁed loan duration23:
Mortgage duration Quarterly repayment rate ξ
30 yrs 0.0083
20 yrs 0.0125
15 yrs 0.0166
10 yrs 0.025
Below we describe the eﬀects on the transmission of policy shocks of varying, alter-
natively, the institutional parameters χ and ξ, and of varying the interest rate mortgage
structure. Throughout we assume that (i) durable prices are ﬂexible; (ii) the elasticity of
substitution η equals 1 (which implies Cobb-Douglas preferences in consumption and housing
services); (iii) the monetary policy rule features a reaction to consumption price inﬂation.24
We assume that the monetary policy innovation is a purely i.i.d. shock to the policy rule
(32). The temporary nature of the shock helps to highlight how the transmission mechanism
built in the model contributes to generate an eﬀect of endogenous persistence in response to
policy impulses.
6.2 Varying the Down-Payment Rate
Figure 5 depicts the eﬀect on selected (per capita) variables of a 25 basis points rise in the
nominal (policy) interest rate for alternative values of the down-payment rate χ.I n o r d e r
to isolate the role of down-payment we assume full mortgage reﬁnancing, i.e., ξ = δ,a n da
variable interest-rate mortgage structure.
We consider two variants to the baseline calibration: (i) a low down-payment rate
χ =0 .15, similar to the level prevailing for example in Spain, and (ii) a high down-payment
23For instance, the quarterly repayment rate for a 30-year loan is computed as 100
120 =0 .83%.
24All our results do not hinge on these assumptions in any signiﬁcant way.
27rate χ =0 .5, close to the situation in Italy (see Table 1). Most of the countries in our sample
are comprised within this range for χ.
Notice, ﬁrst, that the monetary policy tightening induces a rise in the shadow value
of borrowing ψt. This signals a rise in current and expected future values of the Euler gap
(see equation (16)), which in turn induce a contractionary eﬀect on borrrower’s consumption
(collateral-constraint eﬀect). Since house prices are ﬂexible (and consumption prices sticky),
the policy tightening induces also a fall in the real house price qt, which in turn reduces
directly the collateral value, further contributing to a tightening of the borrowing conditions
(asset-price eﬀect). As a result, real debt falls, the demand for housing services drops on
impact and then starts to gradually revert back towards the steady state.
To better understand why, despite prices being ﬂexible in that sector, the demand for
housing services falls, it is useful to notice that a policy tightening increases the user cost of
housing. The relevant user cost for housing can be written, from (12), as:
usct ≡ Zt − β(1 − δ)Et
½
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
Zt+1
¾
(39)
Thus the user cost depends positively on the current eﬀective relative price of housing and
inversely on the future price. (Intuitively, expected capital gains on the holding of housing
decrease the current user cost.) In turn, under a collateral constraint, the eﬀective price of
housing Zt depends on the shadow value of borrowing ψt. Figure 5 makes clear that ﬂuc-
tuations in the shadow value of borrowing (and therefore in the Euler gap) overwhelmingly
drive the user cost. As a result, a policy tightening induces a rise in the user cost and a fall
in the relative demand for housing services.
A smaller down-payment rate χ leads to a more pronounced impact eﬀect of the mon-
etary policy shock on consumption, real debt and the relative price of durables q.A ss u g -
gested above, the monetary tightening amounts to a negative shock to real income. In light
of that, the borrower would like to decrease borrowing and therefore consumption. A lower
down-payment χ increases the eﬀective rate at which the impatient agent can contract bor-
rowing between any two periods in time. A more rapid contraction of borrowing leads to
a more rapid contraction of both housing services and consumption. In addition, a lower
down-payment rate increases, all else equal, the sensitivity of borrowing to changes in the
value of the collateral, leading to a magniﬁcation of both the nominal debt channel and the
28collateral-constraint channel.
Aggregate Responses Figure 6 illustrates the eﬀects of the same policy shock on
aggregate consumption for alternative values of the down-payment rate. We deﬁne aggregate
consumption as25:
Ct ≡ ωCt +( 1− ω)e Ct (40)
Aggregation requires ﬁrst an understanding of the savers’ consumption responses to the
policy shock. Recall that the savers are standard permanent-income agents. Two competing
eﬀects drive their demand. For one, a positive income shock, which is the counterpart of
the negative income shock for the borrowers. This eﬀect leads the savers to increase both
consumption and housing services. However, the rise in the real interest rate makes them
substitute consumption intertemporally, so that, on balance, savers’ consumption is observed
to move only slightly (and to fall in particular, not shown). At the same time, since the
relative price of durables falls, the savers increase their demand for housing services. For
these agents, in fact, the relevant user cost of housing is the one prevailing in the absence of
any collateral constraint, and therefore it depends heavily on the behavior of the relative price
qt (and not on ψt). Overall, we observe that the model exhibits aggregation properties in
line with our empirical evidence. Aggregate consumption falls in response to the shock, with
the impact response of consumption being magniﬁed for lower values of the down-payment
rate χ.
Persistence Notice that the eﬀect on consumption extends beyond the duration of the
policy shock (which is i.i.d.). This eﬀect of persistence depends on the form of the collateral
25T h ec h o i c eo ft h es h a r eo fb o r r o w e r sω is irrelevant for the computation of aggregate (consumption)
responses. In fact, it is easy to show that the set of equilibrium conditions expressed in terms of aggregate
variables diﬀers from the one expressed in per-capita terms only up to a constant (and featured in the
condition equating the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the real wage). In
practice, when log-linearizing equation (40), the steady-state share of consumption of the two groups will
adjust with ω accordingly to keep the aggregate response unchanged. Alternatively, one can have ω to matter
by normalizing consumption of borrowers and savers to be the same across categories of groups (as in Galí
et al. (2006)). This strategy may be justiﬁed when the exercise (indeed as here) focuses on the short-run
dynamic responses to shocks in the neighborhood of the steady state. An equalization of the consumption
levels across groups can be achieved by an appropriate calibration of lump-sum transfers in the steady state.
Quantitatively, however, the results for aggregate consumption are only little aﬀected by the choice of the
aggregation strategy.
29constraint, namely on the ability of borrowing being linked to an asset with high durability.
In turn, the persistence depends on the value of δ, and obviously tends to vanish for values
of δ → 1. Intuitively, when real income falls (rises) because of an increase (decrease) in
real interest rates, the borrower optimally wishes to decrease (increase) real debt. But this
requires depleting (increasing) the stock of housing. Since housing durability implies that
the ﬂow-stock ratio is low, it takes time to change the stock of housing, and therefore the
demand for debt changes only gradually over time. In turn, this is reﬂe c t e di nag r a d u a l
eﬀect on consumption.
Shutting Down Stickiness: Decomposing the Channels Next we evaluate the
role of price stickiness. We compare the response of aggregate consumption under three
scenarios: (i) ﬂexible consumer prices; (ii) low stickiness and (iii) baseline stickiness. The
ﬁrst scenario, coupled with our maintained assumption that house prices are ﬂexible, entails
that prices are fully ﬂexible in both sectors. In the second scenario, the frequency of price
adjustment is less than one quarter, in line with the empirical micro-based evidence of Bils
and Klenow (2004) for the U.S.. In the third scenario, the frequency of price adjustment
is at our baseline value of four quarters (considered realistic for the EA countries based on
the micro-based evidence discussed in Angeloni et al. (2006)). Notice that the ﬂexible-price
scenario corresponds to a shutting-down of the asset price channel, since the relative price of
housing will remain constant in response to a monetary policy variation, and hence will not
aﬀect the value of the collateral. As already argued above, though, abstracting from price
stickiness in consumption prices alters also the strength of both the nominal-debt channel
and of the collateral constraint channel.
Figure 7 depicts the eﬀects on aggregate consumption of a 25 basis points increase in the
nominal interest rate under alternative degrees of consumer price stickiness. Moving from the
baseline case of four-quarter stickiness to the one of fully ﬂexible prices substantially reduces
the eﬀect on consumption. On the other hand, though, the experiment shows that price
stickiness is not a strictly necessary ingredient to the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy shocks. Overall, under ﬂexible prices, and conditional on our parameterization, we
ﬁnd that a 1% rise in the policy rate reduces aggregate consumption on impact by 0.8%.
The residual impact on consumption under ﬂexible prices is still sizeable and is due to the
combination of the nominal-debt eﬀect and of the collateral-constraint eﬀect.
306.3 Varying the Repayment Rate
Figure 8 depicts the response of aggregate consumption to a temporary (i.i.d.) 25 basis-point
rise in the nominal policy rate under alternative values of the repayment rate ξ.W ed on o t
report per-capita responses of selected variables because the picture is qualitatively similar
to the one obtained above under alternative values for χ.
The values chosen for ξ are the ones reported earlier, which correspond to alternative
durations of the underlying mortgage contract. The baseline case, labelled full reﬁnancing,
corresponds to ξ = δ. We think of this as a limit case in which continuous mortgage
reﬁnancing allows to make the rate of housing "economic" depreciation coincide with the
physical rate of depreciation. Hence, implicitly, values of ξ higher than δ can be thought of
as capturing a reduced ability to reﬁnance the mortgage. Notice that the eﬀect of varying
the repayment rate is qualitatively similar to the one of changing the down-payment rate,
i.e., the peak response of consumption is magniﬁed by lowering ξ.I n f a c t , a l o w e r ξ rises
the eﬀective rate (1 − χ)(1 − ξ)j a tw h i c ht h ei m p a t i e n ta g e n tc a ne x p a n db o r r o w i n gi n
any future period t + j. The latter point explains also why varying the repayment rate ξ
aﬀects not only the impact response of consumption, but also its persistence, with a lower ξ
generating a more persistent decline of consumption below baseline.
6.4 Varying the Interest-Rate Mortgage Structure
Figure 9 displays the eﬀect of varying the interest-rate mortgage structure (which, in practice,
corresponds to the degree of interest rate pass-through). We analyze three cases. The ﬁrst
case considers a debt structure in which the mortgage rate is freely linked to the short-term
policy rate (variable rate, Rm
t = Rt for all t, or alternatively τ =0in equation (7)). The
second case considers an intermediate possibility in which the mortgage interest rate is linked
t oar e t u r no nat e n - y e a rb o n d( m =4 0 , see equation (7)). The third case is a limit case
of ﬁxed-rate mortgage structure. This is obtained by considering the variant of the term
structure equation (7) for τ → 1, with maturity m extending to a 30-year period.
A ﬁxed-rate mortgage structure signiﬁcantly dampens the dynamic eﬀect on consump-
tion relative to a case of ﬂexible-rate structure. Notice, however, that a ﬁxed-rate structure
does not necessarily imply that consumption is unresponsive on impact. In this case, a
policy tightening is still generating both a nominal-debt and a collateral-constraint eﬀect
31(via a fall in the relative price of durables, which in turn depresses borrowing capability).
With real house prices returning back to baseline, then, the eﬀect on consumption is quickly
reversed in the case of a ﬁxed-rate mortgage structure, whereas it continues to persist under
a variable rate structure.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have studied the role of institutional characteristics of mortgage markets for the trans-
mission of monetary policy on house prices and consumption in a sample of OECD countries.
We have provided evidence in support of three facts: ﬁrst, there is signiﬁcant divergence in
the structure of mortgage markets across the main industrialised countries; second, at the
business cycle frequency, the correlation between consumption and house prices increases
with the degree of ﬂexibility/development of mortgage markets; third, the transmission of
monetary policy shocks on consumption and house prices is stronger in countries with more
ﬂexible/developed mortgage markets.
We have then built a DSGE model of the monetary transmission with three non-standard
features: (i) two sectors; (ii) heterogeneity in patience rates; (iii) a collateral constraint on
borrowing. We have analysed how the response of consumption to monetary policy shocks
is aﬀected by alternative values of three important institutional parameters of mortgage
markets: (i) the down-payment rate; (ii) the mortgage-repayment rate (a proxy for the
possibility of mortgage reﬁnancing); (iii) interest-rate mortgage structure (variable vs. ﬁxed
interest rate). Consistent with our empirical evidence, the sensitivity of consumption to
monetary policy shocks increases with lower values of the down-payment rate and of the
mortgage repayment rate, and is larger under a variable-rate mortgage structure. Thus the
model can rationalize the evidence that private consumption is more responsive to monetary
impulses in economies with more developed/ﬂexible mortgage markets, somewhat in contrast
with the presumption that developed mortgage markets should be conducive to more eﬃcient
consumption-smoothing.
There are several issues that have remained unexplored in this work and that it would
be interesting to pursue in future research work. First, providing a full estimation of the
model.26 Second, introducing an endogenous choice by the households between variable and
26Iacoviello and Neri (2006) is an interesting step in this direction.
32ﬁxed-rate mortgage contracts. Third, studying how the optimal conduct of monetary policy
varies according to the characteristics of mortgage markets, and in particular in the context
of a currency area (such as the euro area) in which the heterogeneity of mortgage market
institutions remains widespread.
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37TABLE 1.   Institutional Characteristics of National Mortgage Systems 
Country Mortgage 
debt to GDP 
ratio (2004) 
Home 
ownership 
ratio 
a 
Loan to 
value ratio 
b 
 
Interest rate 
adjustment 
c 
Typical 
duration 
(years) 
Equity 
release 
products 
        
BE 31% 
 
 
72% 80-85%  F(75%) 
M(19%) 
V(6%) 
 
20 
 
No 
DE 52%  39%  ≈70% Mainly  F  and 
M 
≤30 Not  used 
DK 
 
67 59 80  F  (75%) 
M (10%) 
V (15%) 
30 Used 
GR 21%  80%  70-80%  F(5%) 
M(15%) 
V(80%) 
15-20 Very  limited 
use 
        
ES 46%  85%  ≈80% V(≥75%) 
Rest mainly M 
15-25 Very  limited 
use 
        
FR  26% 58% 80%  F/M/Other(86%)
V(14%) 
15 Not  used 
        
IE 53%  78%  60-70%  V(70%) 
Rest mostly M 
20 Limited  use 
        
IT  15% 69% 50%  F(28%) 
Rest mainly M 
10-25 Not  used 
        
LU 34%  67%  ≤80% V(90%) 20-25 Not  used 
        
NL 111%  53%  112%  F(74%) 
M(19%) 
V(7%) 
10 Used 
        
AT 20% 
 
56% 60%  F(75%) 
V(25%) 
20-30 N.A. 
        
PT 53%  64%  70-80%  Mainly  V  25-30  Not  used 
        
FI 38%  64%  75-80%  F(2%) 
V(97%) 
Other(1%) 
15-20 Used 
        
AU 74%  70%  90-100%  Mainly  V  25  Used 
        
CA 43%  66%  70-80%  F  and  M(92%) 
V(8%) 
25 Limited  use 
        
UK  73% 70% 70%  M(28%) 
V(72%) 
25 Used 
        
US  69% 69% 80%  F(85%) 
M(15%) 
30 Used 
          
JP  36% 61% 80%  F(36%) 
M and V(64%) 
25-30 Limited  use 
        
Notes: a Share of owner-occupied dwelling.  
b Estimated average loan-to-value ratio on new mortgage loans. 
c Breakdown of new loans by type. Fixed (F): Interest rate fixed for more than five years or until expiry; 
Mixed (M): Interest rate fixed between one and five years; Variable (V): Interest rate renegotiable after 
one year or tied to market rates or adjustable at the discretion of the lender. 
Sources: Ahearne et al. (2005), Borio (1996), Catte et al. (2004), Debelle (2004), ECB (2003), European 
Mortgage Federation, Girouard and Blöndal (2001), IMF (2004), Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004).  TABLE 2. House Price Data  
 
Country 
 
Source and definition  Availability 
Germany 
 
Deutsche Bundesbank: 
Residential property prices, 
new and existing dwellings; 
good & poor condition; West 
Germany (until 1994), whole 
country (from 1995) 
West Germany: annual data 
from 1980 to 1994. 
Germany: annual data from 
1995 
Spain 
 
Banco de España and Bank of 
England: Residential property 
price per square meter, whole 
country   
Annual data from 1980 to 
1986 
Quarterly data from 1987 Q1 
 
France 
 
Ministry of Equipment/ECLN 
and Bank of England: 
Residential property prices, 
new flats; good & poor 
condition; whole country 
Annual data from 1980 to 
1984 
Quarterly data from 1985 Q1 
Italy 
 
Banca d’Italia: Residential 
property prices, new 
dwellings; good & poor 
condition; whole country 
Semiannual data from 1965 
H1 
 
The Netherlands 
 
DNB: Residential property 
prices, existing dwellings; 
good & poor condition; whole 
country  
Monthly data from January 
1976 
Austria 
 
ECB: Residential property 
prices, new and existing 
dwellings; good & poor 
condition; whole country 
Quarterly data from 1986 Q3 
Belgium 
 
STADIM: Residential 
property prices, existing 
dwellings; good & poor 
condition; whole country 
Quarterly data from 1981 Q1 
Denmark 
 
NSI: New and existing one-
family houses; whole country 
Quarterly data from 1971 Q1 
Canada BIS:  residential  property 
prices, existing dwellings, 
national average 
Monthly data from January 
1980 
United Kingdom 
 
ONS: Residential property 
prices, new and existing 
dwellings; good & poor 
condition; whole country 
Quarterly data from 1968 Q2 
United States 
 
BIS: residential property 
prices, existing single-family 
homes, per dwelling 
Quarterly data from 1975 Q1 
 
Note: Lower-frequency data have been converted to quarterly frequency by linear interpolation.  
 TABLE 3. Correlation between the Real House Price and Consumption 
 
Country Correlation  coefficient 
United Kingdom 
 
0.79 
Spain 
 
0.66 
Denmark 
 
0.57 
Canada 
 
0.52 
United States 
 
0.52 
France 
 
0.45 
Netherlands 
 
0.4 
Austria 
 
0.23 
Belgium 
 
0.15 
Germany 
 
0.12 
Italy 0.05 
 
 
TABLE 4.  Correlation between Real House Price and Consumption 
 
Institutional feature  Correlation coefficient 
Mortgage refinancing 
 
 
          No 
 
0.31 
          Yes 
 
0.57 
Interest rate structure 
 
 
         Fixed  interest rate 
 
0.37 
          Variable interest rate 
 
0.5 
 
Notes: Quarterly data from 1980:1 to 2004:4. The real house price is deflated using the CPI. Consumption 
corresponds to total private consumption. Data are de-trended using the HP1600 filter. Countries where 
mortgage refinancing is practiced are the US, UK, the Netherlands and Denmark; it is not practiced in 
Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria and Belgium. Countries with predominantly variable rate 
mortgages are the UK, Spain and Italy; fixed rate mortgages are more common in the remaining countries.  
TABLE 5. Cross-country Average Absolute Response of Consumption to a 
Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock of 100 basis points 
 
 
Average response of consumption  Average response of the real house price 
 
Fixed interest rate 
 
0.19 Fixed  interest  rate 
 
0.64 
Variable interest 
rate 
 
0.42 Variable  interest 
rate 
 
1.61 
Mortgage 
refinancing 
0.56 Mortgage 
refinancing 
1.82 
No mortgage 
refinancing 
0.08 No  mortgage 
refinancing 
0.38 
 
 
Note: Results are based on the VAR model estimated on quarterly data over the sample 
period 1980:1 to 2004:4. See text for further explanations. Countries where mortgage 
refinancing is practiced are the US, UK, the Netherlands and Denmark; it is not practiced 
in Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria and Belgium. Countries with 
predominantly variable rate mortgages are the UK, Spain and Italy; fixed rate mortgages 
are more common in the remaining countries. 
  
 
FIGURE 1a. Correlation between Private Consumption and Real House Price and 
Mortgage-to-GDP Ratio  
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Sample period: Quarterly data from 1980:1 to 2004:4. The real house price is deflated 
using the CPI. Data are de-trended using the HP1600 filter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
FIGURE 1b. Correlation between Private Consumption and Real House Price and 
Home Ownership Ratio 
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Sample period: Quarterly data from 1980:1 to 2004:4. The real house price is deflated 
using the CPI. Data are de-trended using the HP1600 filter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
FIGURE 1c. Correlation between Private Consumption and Real House Price and 
MOW Completeness Index  
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Sample period: Quarterly data from 1980:1 to 2004:4. The real house price is deflated 
using the CPI. Data are de-trended using the HP1600 filter. Note: the Mercer Oliver 
Wyman index is only available for EU countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1d. Correlation between Private Consumption and Real House Price and 
LTV Ratio  
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Sample period: Quarterly data from 1980:1 to 2004:4. The real house price is deflated 
using the CPI. Data are de-trended using the HP1600 filter.   FIGURE 2.  VAR Impulse Responses to a 100 b.p. Shock to the Nominal Interest 
Rate (with 90% confidence bands) 
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 FIGURE 2 (continued).  
 
Germany
France
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
-5.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
-5.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
  
Italy
United Kingdom
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
-5.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
-5.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 2. (continued) 
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Note: Results are based on the VAR model estimated on quarterly data over the sample 
period 1980:1 to 2004:4. See text for further explanations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
FIGURE 3. VAR Peak Responses of Total Private Consumption to a Contractionary 
Monetary Policy Shock and Indicators of Development and Flexibility of Mortgage 
Markets 
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 FIGURE 3.  (continued)   
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Note: Results are based on the VAR model estimated on quarterly data over the sample 
period 1980:1 to 2004:4. See text for further explanations. The Mercer Oliver Wyman 
index is only available for EU countries.  
FIGURE 4. VAR Peak Responses of the Real House Price to a Contractionary 
Monetary Policy Shock and Indicators of Development and Flexibility of Mortgage 
Markets 
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 FIGURE 4. (continued) 
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FIGURE 5.  Model Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Tightening (i.i.d. 
shock): Effect of Varying Down-Payment Rate χ (solid line χ = 15%, dashed line χ = 
50%) 
 
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Housing Services (borrowers)
0 2 4 6 8
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Consumption (borrowers) 
0 2 4 6 8
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Real Debt 
0 2 4 6 8
0
2
4
6
8
Shadow Value of Borrowing
0 2 4 6 8
−0.25
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
Relative Price of Durables
0 2 4 6 8
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
User Cost
down−payment 15%
down−payment 50%  
 
 
  
 
FIGURE 6.  Model Impulse Response of Aggregate Consumption to a Monetary 
Policy Tightening (i.i.d. shock): Effect of Varying Down-Payment Rate χ 
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FIGURE 7.  Model Impulse Response of Aggregate Consumption to a Monetary 
Policy Tightening (i.i.d. shock): Effect of Varying Consumption Price Stickiness 
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Note: low-stickiness and baseline stickiness correspond respectively to 2-quarter and 4-quarter frequency 
of price adjustment in consumer prices. 
 
FIGURE 8.  Model Impulse Response of  Aggregate Consumption to a Monetary 
Policy Tightening (i.i.d. shock): Effect of Varying Repayment Rate ξ 
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FIGURE 9.  Model Impulse Response of Aggregate Consumption to a Monetary 
Policy Tightening (i.i.d. shock): Effect of Varying the Interest Rate Mortgage 
Structure 
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